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ENDOGENOUS MARKUPS AND FISCAL POLICY
*
By Luís F. Costa
This article analyses a simple imperfectly competitive general equilibrium
model where the entry mechanism generates an endogenous markup. In this
second-best world fiscal policy is more effective than in Walrasian or in fixed-
markup monopolistic competition models, as it produces efficiency gains
through entry.
1. Introduction
The role of imperfect competition in the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy
has been analysed by several authors following the seminal paper by Hart (1982).
Dixon (1987) and Mankiw (1988) demonstrated the multiplier is strictly increasing in
the monopoly degree, as pure profits are generated, stimulating households’ income
and consequently aggregate demand. Startz (1989) introduced entry in a 'long-run'
model, eliminating pure profits and, as a consequence, switching the profit-multiplier
mechanism off. Dixon and Lawler (1996) showed Startz’s conclusions strongly
depended on the class of functionals chosen, namely constant marginal shares in the
utility function. Recent developments extended the basic Dixon, Mankiw and Startz
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(DMS) framework: e.g., Heijdra and van der Ploeg (1996), Molana and Montagna
(2000), Reinhorn (1998), and Torregrosa (1998).
However, all these models share a common Bertrandian flavour: they use Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic competition as the basic market structure
1. Given the
CES sub-utility function assumed, each firm faces a constant-elasticity demand
function, hence the markup is also constant. This assumption is not consistent with the
evidence presented in Galí (1995), Martins and Scarpetta (1999), and Rotemberg and
Woodford (1995) that support the hypothesis of counter-cyclical markups.
 Rotemberg and Woodford (1995), Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) and Galí
(1994a) Galí (1994b) Galí (1995), inter alia, produced dynamic general equilibrium
models with endogenous markups. However, they were not especially concerned with
fiscal policy effectiveness. Wu and Zhang (2000) assumed monopolistic producers are
large at the economy level therefore considering the feedback effects of their own
prices on aggregate price and quantity indices. However, the endogenous markup
disappears for a large number of goods in the economy.
In this paper I use a Cournotian Monopolistic Competition framework, following
d'Aspremont et al. (1997), generating an endogenous markup when entry means more
firms per industry. Here, fiscal policy produces an aggregate demand externality as it
stimulates entry, pushing the markup downwards, and introducing efficiency gains in
the economy.
                                                
1 Dixon (1987) and Hart (1982) are exceptions where the flavour is mainly Cournotian, but entry is not
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2. The model
I use the basic structure of the DMS framework, and Mankiw’s notation wherever
possible. This is a closed economy populated by a large number of identical
households, consuming n (a large number of) imperfect substitutes and supplying
labour, which is the only input.
2.1. The representative household
Households maximise a Cobb-Douglas utility function given by U=C
a.(1-L)
1-a,
where C is a CES consumption basket, L represents labour supply for a unit time
endowment, and 0<a<1. For sake of simplicity, I assume there is no love for variety in
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where cj stands for households' consumption of variety j=1,...,n, and s>1 is the
elasticity of substitution
2. The aggregate consumption good C is chosen to be the
numéraire, so P, the appropriate cost-of-living index, is normalised to unity
3. The
budget constraint is given by
                                                
2 A weaker condition than s>1 would be sufficient to ensure the existence of a unique equilibrium in
this model.
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where w represents the wage rate, P stands for profit income, and T is a lump-sum
tax. The optimisation problem is solved in the usual two-stage procedure: (i) the
demand for aggregate consumption and the labour supply are derived, maximising
utility given the duality condition S j
n
j j p c P C = = 1 . . :
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2.2. The government
I assume government has the same preferences for varieties as the households, its
expenditure, G, is pure waste, and it is financed by the above-mentioned lump-sum
tax levied on households.
2.3. Firms
The production sector is composed by n identical industries, each one producing a
differentiated good. The number of industries is assumed to be large enough to rule
out feedback effects from the macroeconomic level. Thus, macroeconomic variables
are taken as given by firms. Each industry is composed by m‡1 identical producers. I
assume firms compete over quantities with other firms in the same industry (intra-ENDOGENOUS MARKUPS AND FISCAL POLICY 5
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industrial Cournot competition), and they compete over prices with firms in other
industries (inter-industrial Bertrand competition). This set of conjectures corresponds
to Cournotian Monopolistic Competition (CMC) and it nests Monopolistic
Competition (MC) as a special case where m=1. Firms are labelled such that industry
j=1,...,n is composed by producers from (j-1).m+1 to j.m.
Production technologies are identical in all industries and they are given by
yi+F=1.Li, where yi‡0 represents the output of firm i, F ‡0 is a fixed cost, and Li its
labour input. The representative firm maximises its profits given by pi=pj.yi-w.Li,
subject to the (i) production function; (ii) the ‘objective’ market demand function
given by Yj=(pj)
-s.Y/n, where Yj represents demand for variety j, and Y=C+G stands for
aggregate demand; and (iii) the market-clearing condition given by Y y j i i j m
j m
=
= - + ￿ (
.
1). 1 .
In an intra-industry symmetric equilibrium the condition equalising marginal revenue
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and given an inter-industry symmetric equilibrium prices are equal for all varieties,
i.e., pj=P=1, "j=1,...,n.6 LUÍS F. COSTA
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2.4. Macroeconomic equilibrium
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4 (ii) total profit income is given by
P = = Si
j m
i 1
. p ; and (iii) labour supply equals labour demand, i.e., L L i
j m
i = = S 1
. .
2.5. Entry
Let us assume now firms are free to enter or leave the market in order to eliminate
pure profits. Since profits depend on the level of aggregate demand (or output), there
is a single value for Y that generates pi=0, given m and n
Y m n m = - s. . . . 1 a f F  . (7)















Combining (7) and (8) we obtain a reduced form for the zero-profit condition,
given by h(n,m,G)=0, where, using the implicit-function theorem, it is easy to see that
                                                
4 In a model with differentiated products, (nominal) aggregate output is given by (nominal) value added
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¶h/¶n<0, ¶h/¶m<0,
5 and ¶h/¶G>0. Thus, there are not enough equations to determine
all the endogenous variables in the model. This indeterminacy is depicted in Figure 1.
If we depart from point A, for G1>G0, entry can lead to a situation with more
industries (point B), more firms per industry (point C), or a combination of both
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FIG. 1: THE ZERO-PROFIT CONDITION AND ENTRY





*-1)]. This condition is verified even for small values of n
*.
Imposing G=0 in the initial steady state, the condition is transformed into n
*>a.s/F, and F<1 in order
to obtain m n n
* . . . / . . = ‡ a s s F F a f 1.
6 I will treat n and m as continuous variables, despite the fact they are integers in reality. Of course this
is only a simplifying assumption and one can interpret these numbers as averages.8 LUÍS F. COSTA
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For sake of simplicity I analyse both extreme situations in alternative: in case I
entry leads to more industries (n is endogenous) and the number of firms is always the
same as in MC models; in case II entry leads to more firms per industry (m is
endogenous) and the number of industries is fixed.
3. The multiplier
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2]>0, i.e., an exogenous increase in m reduces the markup,
expanding labour demand, and the real wage increases as a consequence. Furthermore,
this effect decreases when more competition is introduced either at the intra-industry
level (a larger value for m) or at the inter-industry level (a larger value for s). In the





In case I (n is endogenous), dm
*/dG=0, i.e., the markup is fixed and so is the wage
rate. Thus, fiscal policy stimulates output, but there is no difference between the CMC
and the Walrasian multipliers, both given by 1-a. This is the main result in Startz
(1989): once the profit mechanism is switched off, government expenditure partially
crowds out private consumption in the same way, despite the markup level.
                                                
7 Of course F=0 in the Walrasian case, to rule out increasing returns.ENDOGENOUS MARKUPS AND FISCAL POLICY 9
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Here, when government expenditure stimulates aggregate demand, profits increase
and more firms enter existing industries. Consequently, intra-industry competition
increases, the markup decreases, and extra wage income induces another round of the
multiplier. Entry generates an aggregate demand externality, as it induces efficiency
gains in the economy. It is easy to notice that a.dw
*/dG, the efficiency gain, is
decreasing in both s and m. Thus, it is a decreasing function of the monopoly degree
in the economy
8. In this case, free entry does not eliminate the difference between the
CMC and the Walrasian multiplier, and this difference is strictly increasing in the
level of market power, as it happens in 'short-run' models.
4. Steady-State Multipliers in an Intertemporal Extension
In this section I extend the previous model to a dynamic setting. However, I will
keep the basic DMS assumptions to eliminate other possible explanations for the
differences between the fixed- and endogenous-markup multipliers.
Here, the household maximises an intertemporal utility function
9 given by
                                                
8 The Lerner index is given by m=1/(s.m
*).
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10 (11)
where 0<r<1 represents the discount factor and q>0 stands for the reciprocal of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This household can accumulate a stock of the
aggregate consumption good and rent it under the form of capital (K) to firms in a
perfectly competitive market at price R. Thus, its budget constraint is given by
... KwLRKCTK d =++P--- &  .
11 (12)
Maximising the current-value Hamiltonian, we obtain the following behavioural
equations from the first-order conditions
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plus the transversality condition. Equation (13) represents the consumption Euler
equation and equation (14) gives us the labour supply.
Firms use a Cobb-Douglas technology with an overhead
( )
1 ,.. iiiii yFKLAKL
bb - +F=”  , (15)
                                                
10 Time subscripts are ignored for simplicity.
11 Again, the aggregate good is chosen to be the numéraire.ENDOGENOUS MARKUPS AND FISCAL POLICY 11
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where 0<b<1 and A>0.
12 Considering firms do not accumulate capital, they face a
static maximisation problem
13. Therefore, the Lerner index is also given by
m=1/(s.m). The first-order conditions can be written as





m -= , (16)





m -= , (17)
where MPL and MPK represent respectively the marginal products of labour and
capital.
In a symmetric equilibrium the aggregate (gross) output is given by Y=F(K,L)-n.F.
Furthermore, considering F(.) is homogenous of degree one, we can use Euler's
theorem to compute pure profits: P=m.F(K,L)-n.F. Thus, in a zero-profit situation at
every moment in time, the aggregate production function can be written as Y=(1-
m).F(K,L), i.e., considering a fixed markup, this economy is equivalent to a Walrasian
economy using a less efficient technology than F(.).
                                                
12 I assume there is no technical progress, although the model could easily be extended to include
exogenous growth.
13 If firms were to be the capital owners, open-loop strategies would generate the same outcomes.
However, considering feedback strategies (sub-game perfect equilibrium) for an infinitely living firm
induces strategic investment. In this type of environment it is not easy to find a closed-form solution
outside the linear-quadratic framework. See inter alia Driskill and McCafferty (1989) or Fershtman and
Kamien (1987).12 LUÍS F. COSTA
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5.1. The fixed markup model
In the case of a fixed value of m (e.g., equal to one), the markup level is fixed
(m=1/s). Let us define net output as gross output minus capital depreciation Yn=Y-d.K.





























where T0=(1-b).(r+d).a/[(1-a).(r+(1-b).d)]>0. Considering the net output definition,




a).T0]>0. Using both (18) and (19) in the production function, we obtain an
expression for steady-state net output under free entry:
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Again, the steady-state multiplier does not depend on the level of monopoly power,










Net output is increasing in the government consumption level and decreasing in the
level of monopoly power.
6.2. The endogenous markup model
Here I assume, as in case II in the previous section, that firms are free to enter or
leave any existing industry. Therefore, the markup level is now an endogenous
variable, determined by the zero-profit condition, for a given n. Notice the Lerner
index is given by m
*=1/(s.m
*):
( ) ( )
* ***** .,.. n FKLmngY mm =F￿= . (22)
It is easy to observe the markup decreases with net output:






















where  21 ../0 n s T=FT> . Since net output is a function of government
consumption, ultimately the markup level is also determined by G. Thus, we can
differentiate (20) and use the implicit function theorem to show that14 LUÍS F. COSTA
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When the mark-up level increases profits tend to be larger for the same value of
F(.), and this is a positive direct effect on profits. However, the steady-state values for
both capital and labour tend to be smaller with more monopoly power, and this is an
indirect effect on profits. For plausible values of the parameters one could expect the
direct effect to be larger than the indirect. Assuming this is true, it implies that 1-
g'.f'>0 and consequently the markup decreases with government consumption.
However, considering an endogenous markup introduces further problems in the
equilibrium definition. Galí (1994a) showed multiple equilibria can emerge in this
type of models as R=(1-m
*).MPK
* may not always be decreasing in K
*: an increase in
the capital stock decreases its marginal product, but it also decreases the markup,
generating a positive effect on R. Considering ¶R/¶K
*=0 is a non-linear equation in
this model, multiple equilibria may exist here as well. However, there are also two
constraints to be considered: (i) an equilibrium has to generate a capital stock level
below the modified golden rule, and (ii) the equilibrium must be stable
15 in order to
apply the usual steady-state analysis. For simplicity, I will conduct my analysis
ignoring this problem and I will propose a 'conservative' set of parameters to assess
the values of the multipliers and the possibility of multiple equilibria arising with
them.
                                                
15 In Galí (1994a), the 'middle' equilibrium may either be a 'source' or a 'sink,' but the other two are
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Therefore, for a (saddle-point stable) equilibrium, the multiplier is given by







nm =-+  . (24)
Again, an increase in government spending stimulates aggregate demand, inducing
more firms to enter the existing industries. The markup level decreases and total factor
productivity increases as a consequence. Notice both dm
*/dG and f'(m
*) tend to zero
when the Lerner index tends to zero. Also, consumption crowding-in cannot be ruled
out. It can also be demonstrated that
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
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where h is a very complicated function of the parameters. It is not easy to demonstrate
this partial derivative is always positive as it depends on the sign of D. However,
numerical simulation showed that, for plausible levels of the markup measure, i.e., for
m
*<0.5 
(16), the multiplier is an increasing function of the initial markup level.
Finally, I use a 'conservative' set of parameters to illustrate the quantitative
differences that may be obtained between multipliers in case I (exogenous markup)
and case II (endogenous markup) in this dynamic setting. Table I shows the parameter
values used.
                                                




A a b d r F n G
1 0.1816 1/3 0.025 0.015 0.000029 1000 0.0878
The values for b (equals the capital share in steady-state GDP), r and d are
standard in the literature, n was chosen to be a large number, a is consistent with
L
*=0.2, G generates a government consumption share in GDP equal to 0.2, and F
produces a m
*=0.17 (prices are marked 20% above the marginal cost). Only one
equilibrium can be found for this parameter set
17 and the multipliers are 0.843 in case
I and 0.944 in case II, i.e., the endogenous markup multiplier is 12% larger than the
fixed markup one.
This type of efficiency gains can also be found in Devereux et al. (1996). However,
the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy does not depend on an endogenous
markup, but in increasing returns to specialisation, i.e., entry (in a monopolistic
competition framework) as a positive externality in a final-good sector with a
production function that exhibits 'love for variety.'
One of the weaknesses of the approach presented here is that the type of entry is
not endogenously determined in the model. However, this is also the case in a
monopolistically competitive framework, where firms are barred from entering
existing industries. Considering aggregate demand as a positive effect on intra-
                                                
17 The equilibrium is saddle-point stable, as the eigenvalues are l1=0.026 and l2=-0.074.ENDOGENOUS MARKUPS AND FISCAL POLICY 17
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industry competition, there will always be some efficiency gains from increased
competition.
7. Conclusions
The endogenous markup hypothesis has been ignored in traditional static general
equilibrium models with imperfectly competitive goods markets. Considering the
possibility of entry in existing industries produces efficiency gains enhancing the
effectiveness of fiscal policy.
Even when entry eliminates profits, fiscal policy is shown to be more effective
under Cournotian Monopolistic Competition than in the Walrasian case, when the
number of firms per industry responds to the aggregate demand stimulus. More intra-
industry competition leads to a smaller markup, larger real wages, and it launches
another round of the multiplier.
This possibility is consistent with the evidence on counter-cyclical markups and
points towards the necessity of studying the crossed effects between fiscal and
industrial policies.
ISEG - Technical University of Lisbon, and UECE
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